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Introduction 
 
The European Community (the correct legal term in trade matters, hereafter EC) is still a 
recent and ongoing process.  Fifty years is a short time span for such an endeavour (Annex I 
lists the 17 Treaties that have formed its legal basis).3  It is strictly an economic process 
because a straight forward political unification of Europe was out of reach, then, now, and for 
the decades to come.  This ambiguous relation between economics and politics explains why 
the EC commercial policy often received the status of a foreign policy instrument.  This was 
the case in the EC relation with former colonies (during the 1960s), developing countries (the 
1970s), the Central European countries formerly in the Soviet sphere (the 1990s), and 
neighbours or emerging economies (the 2000s). 
 
Yet, economic analysis shows that the trade policy of a country reflects domestic conflicts 
between consumers, import-competing producers, and exporters of the country more than its 
international relation. Hence, this paper begins (section 1) by examining the EC domestic 
scene—the balance between “the EC and its Member States”, the sacrosanct expression used 
in the trade treaties signed by the EC.  The development of the EC commercial policy can be 
seen through the tensions between the Treaty, the European Court of Justice, the 
Commission, and the EC Member States (hereafter ECMS). 
 
Subsequent sections describe briefly the level of protection of the EC in the early 2000s, 
before examining the EC approach to the Doha Round of the WTO during the last decade, 
and the possible return to trade preferences most recently.  A final section concludes. 
                                                          
1 Forthcoming in Kreinin, M.E. and M. Plummer, Editors. Handbook on International Commercial Policy.  
Oxford University Press. 
2 Professor of economics and Director of Groupe d’Economie Mondiale (GEM) at Sciences Po, Paris 
 1
3 For simplicity sake, the paper uses the generic term of the “Treaty” as often as possible.  Unfortunately, the 
drafters of the successive Treaties keep changing the numbering of the Articles. This note specifies the Treaty 
quoted (R for the initial Treaty of Rome, F for the most recent “Functioning” or “Lisbon” Treaty). 
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Section 1.  The Treaty, the Court, and the practices 
 
The Treaty of Rome confers upon the Community as such (not the Commission) power to 
conduct commercial policy.  This so-called principle of the Community’s “exclusive 
competence” makes the ECMS’ Council as the decision-maker giving to the Commission a 
mandate to act on its behalf, with the final decision remaining in the Council’s hands.4  This 
choice reversed the choice made in the 1951 Treaty of Paris which created the European Coal 
and Steel Community (the EC precursor) that had kept most trade policy instruments under 
the control of the individual ECMS.  The main exception to that rule was a then little known 
and used instrument—antidumping. 
 
In the EC early decades, commercial policy was by far the most important of the four policies 
under exclusive competence.5  The EC competition policy seemed odd in the 1960s, when no 
other ECMS than Germany had a true competition policy.  In fact some ECMS were looking 
at planning rather than markets as the ideal way to manage economies.  The two other 
policies under exclusive competence (taxation issues related to the functioning of the customs 
union, and conservation of marine biological resources) were of more limited scope.  The 
Common Agricultural Policy was shaped later (in the mid-1960s) and placed under “mixed 
competence” of the EC and the ECMS.6
 
Extending the coverage of “exclusive competence” in trade in goods 
 
But the Treaty did not define precisely the instruments covered by commercial policy.  It 
mentioned clearly only tariffs. Indeed, as early as the Kennedy Round (1964-1967) the 
Commission started to negotiate on tariffs on behalf of the ECMS (at that time the EC was 
nicknamed the “Geneva ghost”) despite the fact that only the ECMS were GATT Members 
(the Treaty of Rome was notified to GATT, but not substantially reviewed by it).7  
                                                          
4 A parallel could be made with the U.S., with the Council having the role of the U.S. Congress, and the 
Commission the role of the U.S. Administration. 
5 Since the creation of euro, the monetary policy is covered by exclusive competence for the ECMS members of 
the eurozone. 
6 Hence, “re-nationalizing” the CAP by the ECMS is a possibility which is not inconsistent with the Treaty. 
7 The Kennedy Round was instrumental to EC progress.  It helped the ECMS with initially high tariffs to 
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The progressive extension of exclusive competence to the other instruments of trade policy in 
goods—quotas of all types and other non-tariff barriers—was completed only at the end of 
the Uruguay Round (1995).  This was the result of several converging evolutions.  First, the 
European Court of Justice (hereafter, the Court) released several rulings (most notably, the 
1976 Donckerwolcke ruling) which included non-tariff barriers in the EC commercial policy.  
Second, a Treaty provision (Article R115) allowed ECMS to impose barriers to imports of 
specified products into their own territory (these goods being imported freely in the rest of 
the EC) an alternative to EC-wide barriers.  Its use was conditioned on a Commission’s 
authorization that had to be renewed on a yearly basis, a condition which gradually made 
Article R115 obsolete.8  Third, in the late 1970s, the ECMS began to use a “European” 
facade for getting tailor-made trade barriers by using antidumping procedures (antidumping 
cases can be easily tailor-made to the interests of individual ECMS). 
 
Last but not least, today, ECMS have still a last recourse to limit exclusive competence in 
goods.  They can oppose changes in the EC commercial policy that they find contrary to their 
interests by vetoing, or threatening to veto, decisions in other EC policies that require 
unanimity or qualified majority of the ECMS.  The “vetoing” ECMS would drop its 
opposition to the other policies if EC commercial policy was made favourable to its interests.  
That practice reduces de facto the scope of commercial policy within the competence of the 
EC. 
 
As a result, the current situation remains somewhat fluid.  For a vast majority of trade issues 
in goods, ECMS abide by exclusive competence, and tend to devolve trade policy to the 
Commission, to a point of giving the impression that the Commission is fully in charge.  
However, when a ECMS has a critical trade interest at stake, it can act precipitously and 
vigorously confront the Commission.  This makes the EC trade policy more unpredictable 
than it used to be when ECMS were closely monitoring the Commission’s actions, with the 
last months of important trade negotiations witnessing fierce intra-EC disputes on deals 
enforce the cuts imposed by the Common External tariff by obtaining more open markets in the U.S. and other 
GATT Members. 
8 Article R115 became a mere paragraph in the Nice Treaty (Article N134) and is not included in the 
Functioning Treaty. 
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tabled by the Commission.  Solving such conflicts could require to give satisfaction to the 
ECMS, at the risk of blocking negotiations.  It could also involve “compensation” to the 
“loosing” ECMS.  For instance, at the end of the Uruguay Round, France dropped its 
opposition to the agreement by getting an additional package of farm subsidies from the other 
ECMS. 
 
Services and other commercial issues 
 
If the Uruguay Round closed the debate on the Community’s exclusive competence in trade 
in goods, it opened the debate on its exclusive competence in the other commercial issues that 
have been included in the world trade regime by the Uruguay Round (1995), in particular 
trade in services.  Things continue to be complex in these matters. 
 
Services are by far the most important issue in commercial policy:  they constitute 70 percent 
of GDP in most ECMS and the core of future liberalization.  Although written in 1955-1956 
(few people thought about services at that time) Treaty Article R60 (F57) covers services, 
defined as economic activities “provided for remuneration, in so far as they are not [own 
emphasis] governed by the provisions relating to freedom of movement of goods, capital and 
persons”.9  As no country was interested in trade in services before the Uruguay Round 
negotiations, the Treaty provisions remained largely inert until the mid-1980s and early 
1990s. 
 
At the end of the Uruguay negotiations, the Court of Justice released its 1/94 opinion 
(November 1994) which has launched an official process of extending the Community’s 
exclusive competence to commercial policy in services.  The Lisbon Treaty solidifies such a 
competence in its Articles R131 (F206) and R133 (F207) by stating:  “The Commission shall 
make recommendations to the Council, which shall authorise it to open the necessary 
negotiations.  The Council and the Commission shall be responsible for ensuring that the 
agreements negotiated are compatible with internal Union policies and rules.” 
 
                                                          
9 The four freedoms (free movement of goods, services, people and capital) are the building blocks of the 
Treaty. 
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Yet exclusive competence is much more difficult to implement in services where 
liberalization consists largely of regulatory reforms.  In the 1970s, the hope that service 
regulations could be fully harmonized in the EC (a necessary condition for a meaningful 
concept of exclusive competence) collapsed.  The following decades witnessed a constant 
retreat from this approach—from harmonization to mutual recognition, to mutual evaluation.  
As the ECMS are expected to stay in charge of regulatory reforms in services for a long time 
to go, mixed competence will de facto prevail.  The apparent Community’s exclusive 
competence combined with the reality of ECMS-based regulatory reforms in services 
generate an unsatisfactory situation for EC trading partners.  They have to negotiate a trade 
agreement in services with the Commission, but most details of the negotiations and, even 
more crucially, the effective enforcement of the agreement need to be delivered by the 
ECMS. 
 
The most important other commercial issues are public procurement, trade-related intellectual 
property rights, and foreign direct investment treaties.  The first item leaves, by definition, a 
high degree of freedom to the ECMS, and even to the sub-national entities such as regions, 
provinces, and towns.  As a result, the EC disciplines in this domain are mostly of procedural 
nature (transparency, non-discrimination, etc.). 
 
The Lisbon Treaty includes foreign direct investment and TRIPs in the same Articles R131 
(F206) and R133 (F207) that cover services.  However, it is unclear to what extent these new 
provisions will be operational soon, particularly in foreign direct investment matters.  During 
past decades, a few ECMS (notably Britain and Germany) have been able to develop a wide 
set of bilateral investment treaties that they may not be ready to make easily available to the 
other ECMS. 
 
Section 2.  The level and costs of EC protection at the dawn of the Doha Round (2001) 
 
In the late 1990s, Lord Brittan, then Sir Leon Brittan the EC Trade Commissioner, floated the 
idea of a new Round of trade negotiations at the WTO that ultimately became the Doha 
Development Agenda (hereafter, the Doha Round for simplicity sake).  This proposal marked 
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a deep change in the EC approach to GATT Rounds.  Until then, the EC initial position in 
new Rounds varied from cautious to reluctant, because many EC quarters perceived these 
Rounds as an attempt to dissolve the EC in a wider free trade area, hence as a obstacle to the 
long term political goal of European unification. 
 
From a more economic perspective, Lord Brittan’s proposal also surprised many Europeans 
who perceived the EC as a very open economy, compared to the other large economies.  This 
belief was, and still is, best illustrated by the repeated assertions that the EC is the largest 
world importer, without recognizing that its sheer size and some features (such as the absence 
of EC territories capable of producing tropical crops) necessarily make it so.  Yet at the dawn 
of the 21st century the EC still has much protection. 
 
Protection of agriculture and manufacturing 
 
Tariff protection has two main dimensions:  the average tariff level and the tariff dispersion 
allowing tariff “peaks” (defined in what follows as tariffs higher than 15 percent).  From an 
economic perspective, tariff peaks cause most economic distortions, hence deliver the largest 
welfare gains to consumers when eliminated.  They are also key from a political perspective 
because they are a sure sign of powerful lobbies, capable of protecting very inefficient 
sectors, even after more than five decades of liberalisation. 
 
EC protection uses other instruments than ad valorem tariffs (tariffs expressed in percent of 
world prices).  It includes: 
• Specific tariffs, mainly tariffs expressed in euros per physical unit, which cover a 
third of the agricultural products.   
• Quantitative import and export restrictions. 
• Quotas enforced by the EC or “voluntary” restraints imposed by the EC but enforced 
by its trading partners. 
• Antidumping measures, which can take the forms of ad valorem or specific tariffs, de 
facto voluntary quantitative export restraints or minimum price schemes. 
• Safeguard measures, which can also take all of the above forms. 
• Antisubsidy measures, which can take the forms of ad valorem or specific tariffs. 
• Production and export subsidies, massive in agriculture and,  
• Norms and standards stringent enough to make difficult or impossible the import (or 
export) of foreign (EC) goods, as best illustrated by the ban of selling some 
genetically modified food. 
 
It would be ideal to have estimates on the EC “global” protection which would aggregate all 
the above measures in one tariff-equivalent, expressed in percent of world prices for each 
product.  But since this is not possible, the following estimates are limited to three 
instruments:  ad valorem tariffs, ad valorem equivalent of antidumping measures and ad 
valorem estimates of key quantitative import restrictions. 
 
In Table 1, column 1 shows the average level of the EC global protection covering the above 
three instruments at the dawn of the Doha Round; and column 6 shows peak protection.  
Table 1 also compares these estimates with the ad valorem tariffs alone (columns 2 and 3 for 
the averages, columns 7 and 8 for the peaks) for the same year (1999) and for the most recent 
year.  Finally, Table 1 provides the available data for China in order to get a sense of the 
relative speed of trade liberalization in the EC and in China (data on China are only on 
tariffs). 
 
Table 1.  Global border protection in the EC (2000 and 2008) and China (2001-2008) 
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0
1999 [a] 1999 [b] 2008 2001 2007 1999 [a] 1999 [b] 2008 2001 2005
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1
Agricultural products 24.1 17.3 17.2 23.1 15.3 n.a. 236.4 604.3 121.6 65.0
Manufacturing products 7.7 4.5 3.7 14.4 8.8 41.7 26.0 89.8 90.0 50.0
All products 11.7 6.9 6.7 15.6 9.7 n.a. 236.4 604.3 121.6 65.0
China [c]
Maximum tariffs (%)Average border protection (%)
EC China [c] EC
 
Sources:  [a] Messerlin [2001].  [b] WTO Secretariat, Trade Policy Review [2001 and 2009].  [c] WTO 
Secretariat, Trade Policy Review [2001, 2006 and 2008].  n.a.: not available. All averages are unweighted. 
 
The table provides four main results.  First, the level of EC global protection in 1999 is 11,7 
percent—five percentage points above the ad valorem average tariff.  This means that a 
substantial share of EC protection is delivered by opaque instruments (antidumping and 
quantitative restrictions) with well known perverse distortionary effects. 
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Second, the Uruguay Round has only moderately reduced EC protection.  Its impact has been 
notable in manufacturing with a decline of average global protection from 9.5 percent in 1990 
to 7.7 percent in 1999.  But it has been negligible in agriculture, in sharp contrast to a wide 
belief in Europe.  EC farmers and politicians are wrong in attributing their problems to 
alleged farm liberalization of the Uruguay Round. 
 
Third, columns 6 and 8 show that there remain severe tariff peaks in the EC (moreover, some 
of these peaks are based on specific tariffs which vary with world prices).  Such high tariffs 
still protect a substantial share of the EC economies.  In 1999, the level of global protection 
was higher than 10 percent in sectors representing more than one-fourth of the EC value-
added, and higher than 20 percent in sectors representing more than one-sixth of the EC 
value-added.  The highly protected sectors are agribusiness (which is much more protected 
than farmers per se), chemicals, textiles and clothing, and, to a lesser extent, steel and cars. 
 
Last but not least, Table 1 compares the EC to China in order to better understand the 
emerging world trade scenery.  The average Chinese protection is becoming close to EC 
level—it is lower in agriculture, despite the fact that this sector represents a huge share of 
China’s work force compared to 4 percent in Europe.  This situation is all the more 
remarkable because China begun to liberalize only in the very late 1970s-early 1980s, thirty 
years after Europe started.  Similar observations can be made about India or Brazil—though 
to a lesser extent, and with the key caveat that these countries apply tariffs much lower than 
the tariffs they bound at the WTO (hence they could increase their applied tariffs with no 
legal consequence in the WTO forum) while for China and the EC the bound and actual 
tariffs are the same.  Chinese tariff dispersion tends to be smaller than the EC.  The dramatic 
shifts in level and dispersion of protection of the major trading partners, with the emerging 
economies becoming rapidly as open as the EC and the U.S., explain the tectonic changes 
observed in the world economic relations during the last decade. 
 
Protection of services 
 
Services represent about 70 percent of the European economy, but not all of them have been 
the main target of European integration since the mid-1980s.  Treaty Article R63 (F59) 
provides that “priority [for liberalisation] shall as a general rule be given to those services 
which directly affect production costs or the liberalisation of which helps to promote trade in 
goods.”  As a result, the acquis communautaire (the set of EC-wide regulations, hereafter the 
acquis) in this sector is concentrated in a limited number of services, as illustrated by Table 2.  
In particular, the acquis in the mid-2000s does not include key services supplied by public 
entities in most of the ECMS such as health, education, as well as private services of huge 
economic importance including retail distribution, and tourism which were included only 
very recently in the acquis communautaire, with the 2006 Services Directive [Breuss et alii 
2008]. 
 
Table 2. The acquis communautaire in services, mid-2000s 
All
1958 1986 1991 1996 2001 All (shares)
1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 (%)
Freedom of workers 4 1 8 13 2,2
Right of establishment, freedom to provide services 5 1 3 1 10 1,7
Free movement of capital 1 2 1 5 4 13 2,2
Financial services
Banking and financial conglomerates 1 2 5 2 10 1,7
Insurance and occupational pensions 10 5 7 4 11 37 6,3
Securities markets and investment services 1 1 2 9 13 2,2
Others 1 10 11 1,9
Information society and media
Audiovisual Policy 2 3 3 8 1,4
Electronic communications 2 2 7 39 50 8,6
Information Society Directive 4 2 6 1,0
Transport Policy
Land transport: road 6 5 16 25 27 79 13,6
Land transport: rail 1 3 6 25 35 6,0
Inalnd waterways 5 4 10 9 4 32 5,5
Maritime transport 5 6 8 20 50 89 15,3
Air transport 1 17 21 49 88 15,1
State aid 3 2 10 4 4 23 3,9
Energy
Electricity 3 3 0,5
Gas 3 3 0,5
Hydrocarbons 4 2 1 7 1,2
Coal 2 2 0,3
New and renewable sources of energy 1 2 2 10 15 2,6
Nuclear energy 2 4 4 6 5 21 3,6
TransEuropean networks
Transport 1 2 5 8 1,4
Energy 1 3 3 7 1,2
Acquis communautaire in services 48 35 87 134 279 583 100,0
in percent of total 8,2 6,0 14,9 23,0 47,9 100,0
Number of texts
 
Source:  EC legislation in force.  Author’s calculations. 
 
The key question is:  has this regulatory effort improved access to ECMS services by service 
providers from the rest of the world?  Until the late 1990s, there was a naive feeling in the EC 
that adopting the acquis in services—the so-called 1992 Programme, then the Internal Market 
programme—would be sufficient to create an effective “Internal Market” in services, despite 
the robust evidence that it was not the case [Messerlin 2001].  It is only in the mid-2000s that 
the Commission recognized that creating an Internal Market was much less simple than 
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expected. 
 
That said, protection is much more difficult to document in services than in goods.  What 
follows relies on three sources:  data on trade in services, direct information on regulatory 
barriers in services, and on barriers to foreign direct investments, a key instrument for 
acceding to foreign markets in services. 
 
Data on trade in services are notoriously incomplete, and a notable share is included in the 
data on trade in goods.  Comparing intra-EC and extra-EC trade flows in services shows two 
main results.  Between 1995 and 2005, the share of intra-EC and extra-EC trade in services in 
world trade has not changed much.  During the same period, the GDP shares of intra-EC and 
extra-EC trade in services have increased, but roughly at the same rate as the GDP shares of 
intra-EC and extra-EC trade in goods [Gros 2007, Ilzkovitz et alii 2007]. 
 
A first direct information on market opening in services is provided by the OECD indicators 
on the product-market regulations (PMRs).10  Table 3 presents the evolution of these 
indicators for 1998, 2003 and 2008 for 26 OECD members, for various groups of ECMS and 
for a group of OECD “reference countries”.  It suggests three main results.  First, the 
“founding” ECMS have slightly improved their average relative performance compared to 
the OECD reference countries between 1998 and 2003, but not since 2003.  Second, other 
long-standing ECMS (Western ECMS #2) have made no progress.  Last but not least, the 
most recent ECMS (the Central European ECMS) have substantially reduced their regulatory 
backwardness, to the point of having caught up some long-standing ECMS (Western ECMS 
#2).  
 
In short, none of these results presents the acquis communautaire as an autonomous and 
vigorous source of services liberalization.  Founding ECMS are not at the forefront of market 
openness, some long-standing-time ECMS are loosing ground while recently acceded ECMS 
are quickly catching up.  These results are confirmed by other available databases on 
regulatory reforms [Messerlin 2007, 2008]. 
10  These indicators constructed by the OECD (which focus on the network sectors targeted by the Directives) 
range from 0 (most pro-market regulations) to 6 (least pro-market regulations) [Nicoletti 2000, Conway et al. 
  
Table 3. Product market regulations (PMR) indicators 
Group Countries 1998 2003 2008
RC United States 1.28 1.01 0.84
EW1 Britain 1.07 0.82 0.84
EW1 Ireland 1.65 1.35 0.92
RC Canada 1.29 1.14 0.95
EF Netherlands 1.66 1.36 0.97
EW2 Spain 2.55 1.68 1.03
EW1 Denmark 1.59 1.18 1.06
RC Japan 2.19 1.41 1.11
RC Switzerland 2.48 1.72 1.18
EW3 Finland 2.08 1.30 1.19
RC Australia 1.52 1.16 1.23
RC New Zealand 1.36 1.14 1.26
ECC Hungary 2.30 1.91 1.30
EW3 Sweden 1.93 1.49 1.30
EF Germany 2.06 1.60 1.33
EF Italy 2.59 1.81 1.38
EF Belgium 2.17 1.59 1.43
EW2 Portugal 2.25 1.64 1.43
EW3 Austria 2.33 1.76 1.45
EF France 2.52 1.75 1.45
RC Korea 2.35 1.78 1.47
EF Luxembourg -- 1.48 1.56
ECC Czech Republic 2.99 1.98 1.62
ECC Slovakia -- 1.84 1.63
ECC Poland 3.97 2.95 2.26
EW2 Greece 2.99 2.58 2.37
EF Founding ECMS 2.20 1.60 1.35
EW1 Western ECMS #1 1.44 1.12 0.94
EW2 Western ECMS #2 2.60 1.97 1.61
EW3 Western ECMS #3 2.11 1.52 1.31
ECC Central ECMS 3.09 2.17 1.70
RC Reference countries 1.78 1.34 1.15  
Source : OECD, Product Market Regulation Database (website).  The indicators range from 0 (most pro-market 
regulations) to 6 (least pro-market regulations). 
 
Finally, the international provision of services relies heavily on foreign direct investment 
(FDI).  Table 4 presents the available direct evidence of restrictions in specific barriers to FDI 
flows as estimated by the OECD FDI restrictiveness indexes (FDIRIs).11  Table 4 shows a 
wide range of situations among ECMS.  Only a few ECMS are very open to the rest of the 
world, and only those ECMS are likely to be also open vis-à-vis the other ECMS.  By 
contrast, the ECMS with high FDIRIs with respect to the rest of the world are likely to be 
also close vis-à-vis the other ECMS for the services in question. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
2005]. 
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11  These indicators constructed by the OECD range from 0 (most pro-market regulations) to 6 (least pro-market 
regulations). 
  
Table 4.  Foreign direct investment restrictiveness indexes, 2006 
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EF Belgium 22 22 22 22 72 72 22 22 44 44 22 122 248 72 2
EF France 233 33 33 33 72 72 22 22 138 94 22 198 198 72 322
EF Germany 22 22 22 22 122 122 22 22 116 72 22 248 198 22 122
EF Iraly 22 22 22 22 72 72 22 22 88 144 22 494 66 22 12
EF Netherlands 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 55 33 11 411 355 11 611
EW1 Britain 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 83 67 17 267 361 17 17
EW1 Denmark 1000 562 22 22 72 72 22 22 44 22 22 422 22 122 122
EW1 Ireland 22 22 22 22 122 122 22 22 88 44 22 466 66 22 1000
EW2 Greece 462 506 462 462 122 122 22 22 88 88 22 522 254 22 1000
EW2 Portugal 22 66 22 22 122 122 22 22 116 172 22 1000 122 22 122
EW2 Spain 512 66 22 22 322 322 22 22 226 182 22 304 316 22 22
EW3 Austria 348 348 348 348 172 172 172 172 272 172 172 322 472 222 172
EW3 Finland 550 550 110 110 110 110 110 110 110 160 110 310 210 154 210
EW3 Sweden 556 292 66 66 166 166 66 66 116 116 66 316 266 166 166
ECC Czech Rep. 125 375 50 50 50 50 100 50 150 150 50 450 100 100 450
ECC Estonia 1000 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 122 22 22 322 366 22 622
ECC Hungary 100 100 100 100 200 100 100 100 150 100 100 500 400 150 200
ECC Latvia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 132 0 100 10
ECC Lithuania 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 100 50 350 94 50 650
ECC Poland 225 175 75 75 375 375 75 75 75 325 75 375 75 125 175
ECC Romania 250 50 50 50 150 150 50 50 50 175 50 750 150 50 450
ECC Slovakia 75 375 75 75 72 72 72 72 172 172 72 372 122 72 322
ECC Slovenia 125 125 100 100 200 100 100 100 100 100 100 740 244 100 700
EC27 All ECMS 250 166 75 75 117 108 50 48 107 111 48 408 205 76 374
RC Japan 100 100 25 25 286 25 25 25 25 75 25 675 275 25 25
RC United States 75 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 175 275 25 650 275 25 125
EF Founding ECMS 62 22 22 22 70 70 20 20 88 77 20 295 213 40 240
EW1 Western ECMS #1 346 200 20 20 70 70 20 20 72 44 20 385 150 54 38
EW2 Western ECMS #2 332 213 169 169 189 189 22 22 143 147 22 609 231 22 381
EW3 Western ECMS #3 485 397 175 175 149 149 116 116 166 149 116 316 316 181 183
ECC Central ECMS 217 141 58 58 124 102 63 58 97 127 58 443 172 85 508
2
2
00
0
 
Source : OECD [2007].  The indexes measure deviations from “national treatment” on a 0 to 1000 scale, with 0 
representing full openness and 1000 a prohibition of FDI.  GDP-weighted averages for the groups of ECMS. 
 
Table 4 also shows substantial differences in the openness level of the three large economies 
(EC, Japan, U.S.) with the EC27 being the least open, except in air and maritime transport 
(compared to both Japan and the U.S.) banking and insurance (compared to the U.S.) and 
fixed telecom and accounting (compared to Japan). 
 
The costs of EC protection:  estimates 
 
There are two alternative methods to estimate the costs of EC protection.  The first 
concentrates on the peaks of protection.  This requires the use of a partial equilibrium 
approach since available data do not allow the use of a general equilibrium approach when 
focusing on the precise goods subjected to peaks.  Such an approach [Messerlin 2001] can 
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cover a relatively wide set of trade barriers, take into account some consequences of 
imperfect competition, and cover some services.  It suggests two main results:  protection 
costs are close to 5 percent of the value-added of the sectors under scrutiny, if markets are 
assumed competitive;  these costs increase to 7 percent of the EC GDP if imperfect 
competition, widely spread in services, is taken into account. 
 
The second alternative is to adopt a general equilibrium approach which allows for key 
interactions between sectors and operators.  But, it relies on trade-weighted measures of 
protection to aggregate the information into a manageable set of sectors, an approach which 
systematically underestimates tariff peaks, hence the costs of protection.  As a result, these 
models suggest a much lower welfare cost of EC protection (generally less than one percent). 
 
These results call for two additional remarks.  First, the EC protection is inefficient:  it saves 
a limited number of jobs at a much higher costs than the average wage in the sectors in 
question.  This conclusion is reinforced by the following fact.  As most ECMS have relatively 
inefficient labor markets, the number of jobs truly saved by trade barriers per se is probably 
even lower since these jobs would have been protected anyway by existing labor regulations.  
As shown by economic analysis, saving jobs requires much better targeted and monitored 
policies than trade policy. 
 
Second, the EC protection tends to generate high rents to the protected sectors.  Such rents 
are estimated to represent a third of the global cost of protection (compared to a fifth or a 
fourth for tariff revenues) [Messerlin 2001].  Such a high share is due to the fact that the EC 
markets where protection is high (steel, chemicals, food products, etc.) are also characterized 
by a relatively low level of competitive pressures which result from a mix of a tight net of 
regulations and of a widespread tendency to collusive behavior [Amatori 1999].  The large 
share of rents runs against the general perception of protection in the European opinion which 
often sees protection as protecting “public interest”, and opening the economy as favouring 
narrow private interests.  The reality is quite the opposite.  Protection favours the “happy 
few”, to the detriment of a much wider crowd of consumers and producers. 
 
Last but not least, the costs of EC protection may be larger than those in comparably large 
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industrial countries because the Internal Market in goods and services remains so imperfect.  
In 2005, price dispersion among the 15 oldest ECMS is still substantial, with a coefficient of 
variation of 13 percent for goods (down from 20 percent in 1991) and 36.2 percent in services 
[Ilzkovitz et al. 2007].  During the 1997-2006 period, 8 manufacturing sectors and 7 services 
sectors (out of 11 manufacturing sectors and 12 services sectors) showed notable to 
substantial signs of “integration problems” [Ilzkovitz et al. 2008]. 
 
Section 3.  The EC commercial policy in the 2000s 
 
In the late 1990s, the EC Commission became a champion of new WTO trade negotiations.  
However, it was very slow to realize the profound changes in the world situation that 
occurred in the 2000s—particularly, the increasingly cooler U.S. attitude towards trade 
liberalization and the rising influence of the emerging economies, and their insistence on 
opening the U.S. and EC markets for products of interest to them—precisely those which 
have been most protected during the previous decades. 
 
The Doha Round negotiations are moving at a slow pace, if at all since December 2008.  This 
has induced the EC commercial policy to pay more attention to preferential trade agreements 
(hereafter, PTAs) under the form of bilateral agreements (hereafter, bilaterals).  The EC 
renewed interest in bilaterals is driven by two very different motives from those which were 
behind its staunch support to PTAs until the late 1980s.  First is a foreign policy motive.  The 
EC fell behind the U.S. initiatives in terms of bilaterals, negotiated or signed with countries in 
the Middle East, in Latin America or in Asia Pacific, which were largely driven by political 
reasons.  The second motive was a desire to change radically the logic of the PTAs with the 
African, Caribbean and Pacific countries (ACPs), which are the oldest PTAs in the history of 
the EC commercial policy. 
 
The Doha Round 
 
The EC, as was the U.S., has entered the Doha negotiations with a mentality of “business as 
usual”.  It considered itself the dominant player along with the U.S., so that it could trade 
small opening of its agricultural markets for concessions in topics that it was not able to settle 
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during the Uruguay Round (1995) although it priced them highly:  geographical indications 
in agriculture,12 competition policy, rules in investment and public procurement, trade 
facilitation to mention the most important ones. 
 
The 2003 Cancun Ministerial eliminated these topics from the Doha list of topics to be 
negotiated, with the exception of trade facilitation, and more problematically geographical 
indications. It was only then that the EC fully realized that opening its agricultural markets 
was the key condition to get more open industrial markets in the developing and emerging 
countries. 
 
The Doha negotiations took shape only at the 2005 Hong Kong Ministerial.  They have led to 
the Doha “modalities” released in December 2008 by the Chairs of the agriculture and 
NAMA WTO negotiating groups.  What follows refers to these “2008 Doha texts” because 
they are seen as the “best approximation” of what could be the final results of the Doha 
Round. 
 
Negotiations in industrial products (NAMA)
 
In the negotiations on industrial products (“non-agricultural market access” in the Doha 
Round jargon, hereafter NAMA) the EC is mostly a demandeur since its own level of 
protection is generally low with the exception of peak tariffs.  The 2008 Doha texts would 
imply that the EC average tariff would be reduced from 3,7 to just above 3 percent, while EC 
peak tariffs would be sharply cut, from 50 to less than 8 percent. 
 
Turning to the tariffs of the EC trading partners, the European manufacturing sector was 
looking for a simple outcome of the Doha Round:  “no single [industrial] tariff above 15 
percent at the end of the implementation period, except for LDC)” [Businesseurop/UNICE 
2001].  The 2005 Hong Kong Ministerial adopted a “Swiss” formula as the formula for 
cutting tariffs. 13  The Businesseurop request would require the adoption of a Swiss 
                                                          
12 Geographical indications are place names (or words associated with a place) used to identify the origin and 
quality, reputation or other characteristics of products. 
13 The basic Swiss formula is T = [rt/(r+t)] where ‘t’ is the initial tariffs, ‘T’ the post-negotiation tariffs, and ‘r’ 
the reduction coefficient (hereafter the “Swiss coefficient”).  The Swiss coefficient is thus the only element to be 
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coefficient of 18 to 20 by the EC major trading partners.  The current Swiss coefficients 
mentioned in the 2008 Doha texts, ranging from 20 to 25, are close to satisfy this request, 
except for a small number of tariff lines [Messerlin 2011]. 
 
But this result still depends on the exceptions to the Swiss formula that the 2008 Doha texts 
will offer to the developing countries.  Some exceptions (in particular, the possibility to keep 
unbound tariffs or to impose no cuts on 5 to 7.5 percent of the tariff lines) could seriously 
reduce the very positive impact of the above-mentioned Swiss coefficients. 
 
Second, Swiss coefficients ranging from 20 to 25 mean that developing countries would 
mostly bind their tariffs at their current level; that is, would eliminate the existing “water in 
tariffs” (the difference between bound and applied tariffs).  Henceforth, developing countries 
would no longer have the option of raising their applied tariffs to their bound tariffs.  Such a 
reversal was very much feared at the peak of the 2008-2009 crisis, and it would have cost 450 
to 900 billion dollars to the world GDP [Bouët and Laborde 2009, Productivity Commission 
2009]. 
 
Such cuts of bound tariffs would not change drastically the existing level of openness of the 
emerging markets, which are de facto relatively open.  So it does not create great enthusiasm 
among European businesses.  But, although the offensive interests of European business have 
largely been achieved (assuming only few exceptions to the Swiss formula) the EC 
negotiators are continuing to insist on getting more concessions in NAMA from the emerging 
economies.  They have two opposite reasons for such a tactic.  By doing so, they may try to 
open more the NAMA markets of the emerging economies.  But they may also try to limit the 
opening of the EC agricultural markets, because demanding more concessions in NAMA may 
be a way to induce the emerging countries to demand less concessions in agriculture. 
 
Negotiations in “agriculture” 
 
The term “agriculture” in the Doha Round is a misnomer.  The current negotiations deal with 
three times as many agro-industrial or “food” products as farm products.  This little 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
negotiated. 
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recognized feature is crucial because trade liberalization in food products is likely to be 
similar to trade liberalization in industrial products, and could therefore benefit from the long 
experience in the latter.  
 
Negotiations on tariffs.  Largely under the EC influence, the Doha negotiators on farm and 
food products have adopted a liberalization formula, known as “tier-based” formula, which is 
much more opaque than the Swiss formula.14  A tier-based formula has also the key 
shortcoming of cutting the initially high tariffs by less than a Swiss formula.  Yet, from an 
economic perspective, the tariffs that should be cut most are the high tariffs which generate 
the highest welfare costs. 
 
Table 5 provides the tariff cuts to be expected from the 2008 Doha text for the whole 
agricultural sector and for its farm and food components.  15  It shows the strong “tariff 
escalation” in the current EC schedule:  the more processed the goods are, the higher their 
level of protection.  The average tariff of bulk farm products (19.7 percent) is substantially 
lower than the average tariff of the processed food products (32.6 percent), and, even more 
strikingly, the highest tariff for farm products (93.6 percent) is much smaller than the highest 
tariff on processed food (407.8 percent). 
 
Secondly, as the Doha tier-based formulas are softer on the highest tariffs than the Swiss 
formulas, the tariff cuts in the current EC proposal protect food producers much more often 
than farmers.  Table 5 shows that the post-Doha tariffs would be 7.8 percent for the bulk farm 
commodities compared to 12.3 percent for processed food products, while the post-Doha 
maximum tariff would be 28.1 percent for the farm products, compared to 122.3 percent for 
processed food.  Moreover, the food products that would remain the EC’s most protected 
items after the Doha Round are a strange hodgepodge of waste products (dog and cat food, 
offal, whey, etc) goods with a tiny potential in international trade (yoghurts) and products of 
questionable importance (cucumbers, gherkins, etc). 
14 A tier-based formula splits the whole range of the existing tariffs into several tiers (4 to 5 in the Doha Round).  
Tariffs pertaining to a tier are cut by a constant percentage.  For instance, in the case of developed countries, 
tariffs ranging from 0 to 20 percent would be cut by 50 percent, while those ranging from 20 to 50 percent 
would be cut by 57 percent, etc. 
15 The concordance table used has been established by the US Department of Agriculture.  It splits the whole 
universe of the “agricultural” products into four subsets:  the bulk farm commodities, the produce/horticulture 
 Table 5.  Expected cuts of the EC tariffs in farm and food products 
Current
ad val.
equivalent EC Doha Swiss
tariffs initial text formula
% offer 2008 [a]
All "agricultural" products (2011 tariff lines)
average tariffs 24.4 12.9 9.4 9.4
Bulk farm commodities (117 tariff lines)
average tariffs 19.7 11.0 7.8 7.8
maximum tariff 93.6 46.8 28.1 21.8
Other/horticulture farm products (273 tariff lines)
average tariffs 13.6 8.1 6.0 7.3
maximum tariff 118.9 59.5 35.7 23.0
Semiprocessed food products (488 tariff lines)
average tariffs 12.6 7.1 4.9 5.3
maximum tariff 174.9 70.0 52.5 24.5
Processed food products (1120 tariff lines)
average tariffs 32.6 17.6 12.3 11.9
maximum tariff 407.8 163.1 122.3 26.6
Post-Doha tariffs (%)
 
Source: EC tariff schedule, including the ad valorem equivalents of the specific tariffs.  Note: The Swiss 
coefficient of 28.5 would ensure that the average tariff on all the farm and food products is the same as the tariff 
generated by the tier-based formula suggested by the 2008 Doha texts (9,4 percent). 
 
As in NAMA, the 2008 Doha texts on agriculture raise serious problems because they 
provide too generous exceptions to tariff cuts, hence risking unravelling the impact of the 
tier-based formula.  In the same vein, the EC has been pushing hard for an intensive use of 
“tariff-rate quotas” as the preferred instrument for exceptions.  Tariff-rate quotas are well 
known for their opacity and their perverse effects. The quota rents they generate are likely to 
go not to European farmers, but rather to EC-based importing firms or even to foreign 
exporting firms. 
 
Negotiations on farm subsidies.  If tariffs cover farm and food products, subsidies are 
concentrated on farm products.  In the EC system, some agrifood firms may receive 
subsidies, particularly export subsidies.  But these subsidies are mostly compensation for 
high prices of the farm products that these agrifood firms have to pay European farmers.  In 
short, EC agribusiness firms are “quasi-public” agencies for distributing subsidies to the 
farmers. 
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products, the semi-processed products and the processed products. 
 The EC has been in a better negotiating position in the Doha negotiations on farm subsidies 
than the U.S. because, since 2004, it has shifted roughly Euros 25 billions out of the 
perimeter of the prohibited subsidies (“overall trade distorting support” in the Doha jargon).16  
Indeed, Table 6 shows that the 2008 Doha texts would essentially bind the EC and U.S. 
future subsidies at the current or shortly expected within a few years level.  In short, the huge 
“water in domestic support” would be largely eliminated—echoing the above-mentioned 
elimination of the huge “tariff water” in NAMA for the emerging economies. 
 
Yet serious problems remain.  First, subsidies outside the coverage of the “overall trade 
distorting support” may be less perverse than production-based subsidies, but they still have 
an indirect impact on trade flows.  Hence, they should be revisited.  This perspective fits well 
the growing recognition in Europe that decoupled farm subsidies go mostly to large farmers 
for which few Europeans want to fight, hence are facing an increasing legitimacy problem.  
With time it will become increasingly unsustainable politically to grant subsidies to farmers 
on the basis of outputs produced in an increasingly distant past. 
 
Table 6  The liberalization formulas in the “overall trade distorting support” (OTDS) 
U.S. EC15 [c] U.S. EC15
The Uruguay bound commitments 55.0 149.0 47.4 70.6
Effective OTDS (2004) 23.0 78.0 19.8 37.0
Estimated OTDS (2013) [d] 12.4 30.0 10.7 14.2
The Doha draft text (December 2008)
Base levels 48.2 149.0 41.6 70.6
Formula cuts (in %) 70 80 -- --
Commitments 14.5 29.8 12.5 14.1
Support in
billion US dollars [a]
Support in % of
agricultural output [b]
 
Source:  WTO Agriculture Chair text, TN/AG/W/$/Rev.4, 6 December 2008.  Author’s computations.  Notes:  
The overall trade distorting support includes all the farm subsidies deemed to be highly trade distortive.  (a)  
Figures for the EC are expressed in euros in the Chair text, and are translated in U.S. dollars on the basis of an 
exchange rate of 1.35 U.S. dollar per euro prevailing in December 2008.  (b)  Average value added in 
agriculture for the years 1995-2000.  (c)  Past figures for the OTDS for the EC 27 are roughly 106 percent 
higher than those for the EC15.  OTDS for 2013 is estimated for the whole EC27.  (d)  Support for 2013 are 
estimated by Kutas (2010) for the EC and by Orden, Josling and Blandford (2010) for the U.S.. 
 
Second, recent years have witnessed worrisome developments in certain EC subsidy 
                                                          
16 For simplicity sake, this note refers only to the “overall trade distorting support”, but the 2008 Doha texts 
include other disciplines on subsets of different types of subsidies (see Kutas [2010] , Orden, Josling and 
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schemes:  the huge subsidies granted to biofuels leading to effective rates of protection of 
almost 10,000 percent, despite the fact that such biofuels of the first generation have a strong 
negative impact on environment;  the emergence of antidumping measures in agriculture (on 
biofuels imported from the U.S.);  and the re-activation of export subsidies for dairy since the 
2008-2009 economic crisis. 
 
A concluding remark on agriculture.  Whether the Doha negotiations fail or succeed, they 
have achieved an important objective in the EC farm sector .  They have made European 
farmers and policy-makers increasingly aware of the fact that the impact of the Common 
Agricultural Policy varies with each Member state’s production structure.  A ECMS 
producing mostly farm goods protected by high EC tariffs and/or subsidies is, on average, 
“more” protected than a ECMS producing mostly farm goods protected by low or moderate 
EC tariffs or subsidies. 
 
Table 7.  Level of protection by EC Member States, 2004 
Global Tariffs
EC Member States protection (%)
[a] [b]
Ireland 91 26.2
Luxemburg 69 25.6
Britain 66 25.5
Finland 65 26.5
Sweden 65 25.5
Lithuania 58 26.6
Germany 56 24.5
Latvia 56 25.3
Austria 55 22.9
France 55 21.6
Czech Republic 54 26.6
Belgium 53 22.7
Slovenia 52 21.2
Estonia 51 27.2
Slovakia 51 25.2
Netherlands 50 19.1
Denmark 49 26.1
Poland 45 24.5
Hungary 41 23.5
Italy 41 19.1
Spain 41 19.1
Portugal 40 18.3
Greece 37 18.7
Malta 35 18.6
EC (16 Member States) 51 21.9
EC (24 Member States) 57 23.3  
Sources:  OECD, WTO.  Notes: [a] PSE:  producer surplus equivalent, as calculated by the OECD.  [b]  Ad 
valorem tariffs in 2004 (specific tariffs excluded).  It is impossible to update these results because the European 
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Blandford [2010] or WTO website). 
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agricultural policy has been increasingly modulated by the ECMS since 2004. 
 
Table 7 illustrates this point by weighting each ECMS’ farm production by the EC-wide level 
of protection, be it measured by tariffs or by the combined protection granted by tariffs and 
subsidies as measured by the OECD “producer support equivalents”.  It shows that PSEs vary 
from one to 2,6 and tariffs from one to 1,4.  
 
Contrary to common belief, French farmers are not among the most protected in the EC:  
farmers from ECMS favouring freer trade (Britain or Sweden for instance) are on average 
more protected.  This situation should induce French farmers to be among the most 
supportive of market opening in agriculture since a large share of French agriculture is not 
protected by the Common Agricultural Policy, and since, for those protected farm products, 
French farmers are often considered among the most efficient in Europe. 
 
The other topics included in the Doha Round 
 
The Doha Round negotiations cover potentially many other important topics:  services; 
selected industrial sectors (such as environmental products and equipment goods) which are 
candidates for full liberalization, including non-tariff barriers;  geographical indications;  
rules for antidumping and antisubsidy; and trade facilitation.  But so far all these topics 
except trade facilitation have not been subjected to intensive negotiations because the Doha 
negotiators have agreed to a sequential approach—first negotiate on industrial and 
agricultural goods then on the other topics.  As a result, the EC and all the other developed 
countries have no visibility on what are the opportunities and gains to be expected in services, 
when these activities represent 70 percent of EC GDP and may be the source of substantial 
comparative advantages.  This sequential approach has been detrimental to a rapid and 
successful conclusion of the Doha Round. 
 
Back to preferential trade agreements 
 
In November 2006, Lord Mandelson, the then Trade Commissioner, released a working 
document on “Global Europe” reaffirming the EC support to the Doha negotiations, but also 
developing a massive European strategy of future bilaterals (no less than 24) hence giving a 
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strong impression of a deep change in the EC commercial policy [European Commission 
2006].  It seemed that the EC was going back to its “addiction” to discrimination which 
marked its trade policy from the 1960s to the 1990s, a policy that has left deep scars in the 
world trade system:  a third of the current PTAs notified to the WTO are intra-European 
bilaterals, mainly deals between countries located on the European continent.  This large 
number mirrors the way Europeans are building their Single Market:  any new bilateral 
negotiated by the EC generates mechanically “clone” negotiations by the European countries 
linked to the EC by trade agreements—the EFTA countries, Turkey, etc. 
 
However, the Global Europe document suggests that the new bilaterals have a new raison 
d’être, namely a substantial foreign policy component.  This aspect explains the 
Commission’s repeated statement that the EC is lagging behind in terms of bilaterals.  This 
perception was largely created by the fact that most recent U.S. bilaterals were politically 
loaded.17
 
The fact that the motive behind the Global Europe agenda is largely “political” raises a key 
question.  Would the bilaterals envisaged by the EC be dominated by “market opening” 
forces or by “market preference” forces?  The former case occurs when negotiating countries 
apply low tariffs on goods imported from countries other than the signatories of the deal and 
enforce domestic pro-competitive regulations on services and investment.  Such bilaterals are 
likely to have a net positive economic effect on the signatories, and no significant negative 
impact on the rest of the world.  They may be stepping stones to world trade liberalization 
and, by the same token, enhance EC political influence without costing much to the EC or its 
PTA partners. 
 
By contrast, market preferences-dominated bilaterals,  namely high tariffs on goods imported 
from the rest of the world and anti-competitive domestic regulations on services and 
investment are likely to be economically harmful.  The higher the preferences, the more 
17 The US Administration has taken few initiatives in terms of bilaterals (Australia, Korea, Latin America) and 
these were fundamentally driven by foreign policy motives (from the Iraq war to the drug wars).  At this 
juncture, the U.S. has no pending “grand vision” of bilaterals.  The Free Trade Area for the Americas looks like 
a sleeping beauty, the U.S. calls for an Asian Pacific initiative are incantatory but inconsequential.  Lastly, the 
ordeals to get the recent bilaterals approved by the U.S. Congress and the mood of the newly elected Congress 
(revealed by the request for a review of the bilaterals demanded by the new Democratic majority) do not suggest 
distorted the bilateral trade flows that result, and the higher the costs of the bilateral deal 
consumers of the products and services imported from the trading partner.  Hence, the higher 
the likelihood of the collapse of the bilateral agreement, and the more painful the “erosion” of 
these preferences would be for the signatories.  If such bilaterals are likely to be stumbling 
stones to world trade opening, then they are politically costly to the EC, and perhaps to its 
partners as well. 
 
Table 8 compares the EC bilateral policy, when launched in 2006, with the equivalent 
policies of six other countries.  It gives—in an admittedly crude way—a sense of the “market 
opening” vs. “market preference” nature of the 91 bilaterals signed by these countries in 
2006, and of the 100 bilaterals under negotiation or under consideration by these seven 
countries. 
 
Table 8.  Comparing Global Europe to the strategies of other selected countries, 2006 
Number
of at at trading dealing ease of regis- protec-
partners current PPP applied bound across with doing tering ting
USD USD borders licences business property investors
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
A.  Bilaterals signed
Singapore 10 48.5 39.3 4.8 9.2 35.8 41.7 28.0 35.3 16.7
Chile 20 79.0 70.4 5.5 8.0 34.1 70.8 41.5 39.6 46.3
Korea 14 4.1 5.8 7.1 21.5 58.8 70.3 69.0 59.2 68.7
USA 15 7.6 6.5 7.5 19.6 42.9 41.9 29.2 50.1 34.0
China 14 2.9 5.9 8.0 25.4 63.1 77.3 72.8 66.7 55.4
EC 14 [d] 6.4 8.2 9.2 18.3 76.8 91.9 67.1 80.4 53.4
Japan 4 2.7 3.3 10.0 27.4 69.4 62.4 55.6 76.6 52.4
B.  Bilaterals under negotiations or consideration
Singapore 12 90.6 81.2 5.7 9.0 40.0 68.9 43.5 42.3 41.0
Chile 9 [e] 81.6 77.7 6.4 10.3 43.2 77.8 49.4 45.5 45.1
Korea 11 49.1 57.4 7.3 13.3 43.3 85.3 57.6 39.8 40.4
Japan 18 13.4 16.4 7.5 20.0 53.5 58.3 54.8 60.6 56.6
USA 14 14.9 16.5 8.8 21.3 54.1 69.7 52.2 64.7 44.2
China 12 10.4 17.0 10.1 25.5 83.1 96.4 83.5 76.1 47.2
EC 24 23.4 44.2 10.3 17.8 71.1 125.6 91.2 61.8 64.8
Market size [a] Average industrial Regulatory ranking [c]
tariff [b]
 
Sources:  WTO Secretariat, Trade profiles [website].  World Bank, Doing Business [website].  Notes:  [a] GDP 
(in U.S. dollar, 2004) as a share of world GDP.  [b] WTO Trade profiles.  [c] Doing Business indicators (2007).  
[d] Counting as one the 10 countries having acceded to the EC in 2004.  [e] Counting as one the EC. 
 
Columns 2 and 3 give the GDP shares of the seven countries’ trading partners in the world 
GDP calculated both at current and PPP exchange rates.  Thus they offer a sense of the 
coverage of the market preferences that could be created by the size of the partners in the 
existing and future bilaterals of the seven countries in question.  Multiplying the coverage 
indicator by indicators of the level of preferences offers the magnitude of the expected 
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preferences.  Columns 2 and 3 show the diversity of the situations.  The current bilaterals 
cover a very low share of world GDP, except for the two smallest economies.  But the 
bilaterals under negotiation or consideration dramatically changes the picture.  The 
Commission’s proposal generates such a change of scale in bilateralism that it could trigger a 
race to bilaterals among the large countries, if China and/or the U.S. feel compelled to follow 
a strategy as aggressive as the one designed in the EC proposal. 
 
Columns 4 and 5 of Table 8 focus on tariffs, the first key instrument that could determine the 
level of preferences in trade in goods.18 A low average of applied tariffs suggest bilaterals 
more focused on market opening than on market preferences.  By contrast, bilaterals behind a 
high average of applied tariffs are prone to market preferences.  The same could be said in 
case of high average bound tariffs.  Column 4 shows that the EC partners have the highest 
average applied tariffs of the bilaterals under negotiation or consideration by the 
Commission’s proposal.  Column 5 based on bound tariffs suggests again possible substantial 
market preferences for the bilaterals under negotiation or consideration by the four largest 
countries.  In sum, the bilaterals involving the smaller economies tend to focus on market 
access, in sharp contrast to the EC bilaterals that are dominated by market preferences. 
 
Columns 6 and 7 focus on non-tariff barriers, the other key instrument that could determine 
the level of preferences in trade in goods.  As there is no direct measure of such barriers, 
Table 8 relies on the ranking of the partners of the seven countries in two respects:  the ease 
of trading across borders and the ease of dealing with licences, two indicators estimated by 
the Doing Business database.  Ranks are crude indicators.  But the average ranks in columns 
6 and 7 exhibit differences among of the seven countries’ partners so large that they are likely 
to be meaningful.  Once again, the bilaterals under negotiation or consideration by the EC 
appear the more prone to market preferences. 
 
Column 8 to 10 look at services and investments, also with the help of indicators provided by 
the Doing Business database.  The services dimension is captured by the global indicator of 
the ease of doing business with the various trading partners of the seven countries examined, 
18 This is why the seven countries are ranked by the increasing level of the average tariffs applied by their partners in 
bilaterals.   
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whereas the investment dimension is indicated by the ranks in property registering and in 
investors protection among trading partners.  These indicators show the EC and China on the 
one hand, and on the opposite side the five other countries.  Once again, the bilaterals under 
negotiation or consideration by the EC appear the more dominated by market preferences. 
 
To conclude, bilaterals under negotiation or consideration by the Commission’s Global 
Europe agenda seem to be seriously biased towards substantial market preferences.  Their 
short term political benefits for the EC may be quickly eliminated by their long terms 
economic costs generated by market preferences and their erosion following new bilaterals or 
multilateral trade negotiations.  They may also create serious systemic risks in the world trade 
regime.  In particular, they magnify the risk that the aggressive approach of the Commission 
might trigger a race to bilaterals, by inducing the U.S., China and Japan to “catch up” in 
terms of bilaterals. 
 
The Economic Partnership Agreements between the EC and the ACPs 
 
A series of bilaterals currently under negotiations by the EC deserves a special attention:  the 
Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) with 75 African, Caribbean and Pacific countries 
(ACPs). 
 
To some extent negotiating these EPAs was required by WTO rules.  The Yaoundé (1963 and 
1971) then Lomé (1975, 1981, 1985 and 1990) then Cotonou (2000) Conventions did not 
require reciprocity:  the EC eliminated its tariffs on ACP products while the ACPs were 
allowed to keep their own tariffs on EC products.19  As a result, these Conventions were not 
fully consistent with the WTO non-reciprocity rule which is possible for least developed 
countries, but not for developing countries where reciprocity is the rule (roughly half of the 
ACPs are developing countries).  This partial inconsistency was protected by a waiver that 
was due to expire by December 31, 2007.  Despite the fact that the EC and the ACPs started 
their discussions on the post-waiver regime as soon as in 2000, nothing happened before 
October 2007. 
                                                          
19 It is worth noting that the non-reciprocity feature was to be a favor to the ACPs.  In fact, it was quite costly 
for the ACPs, as underlined by Kreinin [1973]. 
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Then, suddenly, the Commission decided to launch negotiations on the new EPAs, and it 
pledged to conclude them by December 2007.  The Commission argued that the waiver 
deadline had to be strictly enforced, an interpretation that was contested by many WTO 
experts.20
 
EPAs require ACPs to eliminate tariffs on 80 percent of their tariff lines for products 
imported from Europe, so that the trade between the EC and each ACP would be tariff-free 
on 90 percent of the tariff-lines (the average of 100 percent on the EC side and 80 percent on 
the ACP side).  It was the EC that defined this threshold of 90 percent, assuming that it would 
be high enough to meet a key provision of GATT Article XXIV (“substantially all the trade 
between the constituent territories” should be covered by a PTA).  ACPs unwilling to sign 
EPAs have only one alternative.  Least-developed ACPs (39 countries) could adopt the EC 
“Everything but Arms” initiative, if not yet done.  Developing ACPs could turn to the 
Generalized System of Preferences, an alternative representing a serious reduction in the 
access of ACPs’ producers to EC markets. 
 
Will EPAs be costly to the ACPs [Delpeuch 2007]?  The main reasons for a positive answer 
are captured by the following example.  Nigeria’s average bound tariffs are 150 percent in 
agriculture and 66 percent in manufacturing (NAMA).  If the EC products enter the Nigerian 
markets duty-free, the EC firms could price their products at up to 1.5 and 0.6 times higher 
than the world price, respectively.  The resulting distortions in ACP economies are huge.  
Behind such high tariffs, inefficient EC firms could charge high prices, and still be preferred 
to efficient exporters from the rest of the world which have to pay the high ACP tariffs.  In 
such a case, the preferences granted by the ACPs in the EPAs are equivalent to ACP 
subsidies paid by the (very) poor ACP consumers to these inefficient EC firms.  Meanwhile, 
behind such high tariffs, EC efficient firms could also charge high prices in order to grab the 
rents generated in the ACP markets by the high tariffs imposed by the ACPs on imports from 
non-EC sources.  In sum, Nigerian consumers, including Nigerian firms which are often large 
20 Last but not least, the EPA issue was intertwined with a very controversial issue:  the EC regime of banana 
imports.  Since 1958, the EC regime was imposing all kinds of non-tariff barriers in an effort to discriminate in 
favor of ACPs bananas and against bananas from Latin America.  It was only in December 2009 that a solution 
was finally accepted by all the parties:  the ACPs, the Latin American producers, the U.S. and the EC. 
consumers, will hardly benefit from liberalization.  At the same time, the Nigerian 
government will lose tariff revenues, and Nigerian firms will have hard time to enter their 
own markets once fully open to EC firms, loosing opportunities to diversify the Nigerian 
economy. 
 
It could be said that this example provides too dark a picture of the situation because the 
effectively applied tariffs may be lower than bound tariffs.  Table 9 suggests that this caveat 
should be treated with great caution.  First, half of the ACPs have average applied tariffs 
higher than 15 percent in agriculture and one fourth have average tariffs higher than 15 
percent in manufacturing. 
 
Table 9.  ACPs current bound and applied tariffs:  an overview 
Overall
binding
average maximum average maximum average maximum average maximum  coverage
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Number of countries with available dat 55 11 62 11 55 11 62 11 53
Average tariff or binding coverage 78.1 85.9 17.1 48.4 46.2 75.9 12.0 40.0 64.3
Number of countries with:
bound tariff higher than 30% 48 9 -- -- 37 8 -- -- 37
bound tariff higher than 50% 37 9 -- -- 23 8 -- -- 30
bound tariff higher than 70% 33 7 -- -- 12 6 -- -- 28
applied tariff higher than 15% -- -- 33 11 -- -- 15 11 --
applied tariff higher than 20% -- -- 18 8 -- -- 3 9 --
applied tariff higher than 30% -- -- 2 4 -- -- 1 4 --
bound tariffs applied tariffs
Agriculture (farm and food)
bound tariffs applied tariffs
Manufacturing (NAMA)
 
Sources:  WTO Member Information (WTO website) and Tariff Profiles when data are not available in Member 
Information files.  Applied tariffs are for 2001.  Author’s calculations. 
 
Second, Table 9 shows that the “peak” tariffs applied by the ACPs are very high:  almost 50 
percent on average for all the ACPs in agriculture, and 40 percent in manufacturing.  These 
peak tariffs are concentrated in domestically produced products (a feature meaning that, 
politically, these are the tariffs the most likely to be kept unchanged under the EPAs by the 
ACPs since they are backed by large lobbies) and because they are the source of the largest 
welfare costs for the imposing country. 
 
Last, many ACPs tariffs are still not bound.  As a result, they can be increased without 
restraint, thus representing huge risks for foreign traders.  For instance, half of the African 
ACPs have bound less than a third of their tariff lines.  Indeed, the increase of imports from 
the EC following the implementation of the EPAs is likely to induce ACPs governments to 
raise their unbound tariffs on non-EC imports.  This is economically unsound, yet a 
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politically likely reaction from the ACPs. 
 
As of May 2010, less than two third of the ACPs have initialled (19 ACPs) or signed (26 
ACPs) EPAs.  No EPA has been ratified.  Moreover, a key initial goal of the EPAs, to favour 
regional integration among ACPs, had to be abandoned.  All concluded EPAs are de facto or 
de jure bilateral, with the exception of the EPA which involve the 15 Caribbean ACPs. 
 
Why such a slow, limited and uneven process?  First is the fact that the aggressiveness with 
which the Commission undertook the negotiations under Commissioner Mandelson  
generated deep oppositions in the ACPs and serious concerns in many ECMS, such as Britain 
or France.  Lady Ashton (the Trade Commissioner succeeding Lord Mandelson) did not fully 
remove these concerns despite her efforts to introduce some flexibility in the rigid format of 
the EPAs.  The second reason is that the ACPs did not try to come up with better alternatives 
for themselves because most of their governments are still convinced that any additional trade 
liberalization would be detrimental to their growth and development.  So, they ended up by 
trying to increase the number of products which could remain protected, making the EPAs 
even more costly to themselves. 
 
Lastly, if the EPA’s are costly for the ACPs, they may become a political trap for the EC.  In 
the long run, they will be perceived by the ACPs as a way to provide a preferred access to EC 
firms to the detriment of the efficient firms from emerging economies, such as Brazil in 
agriculture or China in manufacturing.  The political cost of what could be branded as neo-
imperialism could be enormous for the EC in the long run. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In 2010 the EC is facing a severe crisis, with several eurozone members in great difficulties 
or even on the verge of bankruptcy.  As this crisis will not disappear quickly, it raises several 
important questions. 
 
First is the EC capable of assuming again initiatives on the trade front in the coming months 
or years (from mid-2009 to mid-2010, the EC has been already relatively inert on the WTO 
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front).  An important way for the EC to show its dynamism would be to launch exploratory 
talks in services.  This sector is not only large, but it is still plagued by huge transaction 
costs—two to three times those in goods [Miroudot, Sauvage and Shepherd 2010].  As the 
Doha Round is stuck with its self-inflicted constraint of the sequencing of the negotiations 
(“let us settle goods first”) such exploratory talks on opening services should find another 
forum.  There are several options, the most logical being the Transatlantic forum.  If 
satisfactory, such talks would be very likely to trigger interests among the 10 or so largest 
trading partners of the U.S. and the EC.  If successful in this wider context (the U.S., the EC 
and these ten large countries would represent more than 80 percent of the world value added 
in services) these talks could then be repatriated into the WTO forum, and contribute to 
unlocking the Doha negotiations. 
 
Second, the EC should seriously review its use of trade policy as a foreign policy instrument.  
As suggested above, the short-term benefits of such an approach should be balanced against 
the long term costs which are almost unavoidable for the following reason:  the logic of 
foreign policy is to sign as many bilaterals as possible.  In trade terms, this logic implies that 
future bilaterals will erode the preferences created by today bilaterals—a sure way to make 
businesses disoriented and dillusioned. 
 
Last, commercial policy is only one of the many policy instruments available to a 
government.  “Over-using” such an instrument is a strong tendency in the EC because of the 
way the Treaty is designed, and because it allows the Commission to maximize its role.  But, 
such an over-use may be a source of problems.  A good illustration is the so-called the EC 
“energy dependency” with respect to Russia.  What seems to be a trade problem (EC gas 
imports from Russia and Central Asian countries) is fundamentally a EC domestic problem, 
namely the absence of a competitive EC energy market.  Improving competition in the EC 
energy markets would be one of the best ways to reduce the EC “dependency”. 
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Annex I.  The Treaties establishing the European Community and Union 
 
Dates City of signature Name of the Treaty
1951 Paris European Community of Steel and Coal (ECSC)
1957 Rome European Economic Community (EEC)
1957 Rome European Community of the Atomic Energy (Euratom)
1965 Brussels The Merger Treaty
1970 Brussels The Budgetary Treaty
1972 Brussels Acts of Accession (Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom)
1975 Brussels The Budgetary Treaty
1979 Athens Act of Accession (Greece)
1985 Lisbon, Madrid Acts of Accession (Portugal and Spain)
1986 Luxembourg, The Hague The Single European Act
1992 Maastricht The Treaty on European Union (TEU)
1994 Corfu Acts of Accession (Austria, Finland and Sweden)
1997 Amsterdam The Treaty of Amsterdam
2001 Nice The Treaty of Nice
2003 Athens Acts of Accession [a]
2004 Rome The Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe
2005 Neumunster Abbey Acts of Accession [b]
2009 Lisbon Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union  
Sources:  Official Journal.  Notes: [a] Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, 
Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia.  [b]  Bulgaria, Romania. 
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